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"ALIENS ARE COMING! DRAIN THE POOL"t
John D. Ayer*
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES. By Stan-

ley Fish. Durham: Duke University Press. 1989. Pp. x, 613. $37.50.
LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION. By Richard A. Posner. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1988. Pp. xi,
371. Cloth, $25; paper, $12.95.

I

Who said that an expert is a guy with a briefcase, twenty miles
from home? It's a pretty tired wheeze, 1 but every tired wheeze is
founded on some small truth, and in an age where everyone is twenty
miles from home, it makes a lot of sense. You can't say to the Wizard
of Oz: "Act right or I'll tell your mother." You don't know his
mother, and if you did know her, you'd probably find that she had set
herself up as a professor of nail polishing science at the New University of Cosmetology in a concrete block building on Van Nuys
Boulevard. 2 The temptation to that sort of pretension is just too powerful. It gets you from two directions: pull and push. The pull is that
people (at least if they don't know your mother) tend to take you at
your own valuation, and a very small expenditure' in effrontery can get
you a very large return in creature, and sometimes even spiritual, comfort. In academe - at any rate, in the humanities and social sciences
- the push is sheer panic. More and more people huddling around a
smaller and smaller stewpot, everybody grasping at the rope ladders as
the helicopters lift off from the embassy roof, all fearful that they'll be
left behind among the barbarians. For the professoriate, the most obvious consequence of these convergent forces is that everybody
chooses to act as if the bluebird of happiness nests in the yard next

t
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• Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. B.A. 1963, J.D. 1968, University of
Louisville; LL.M. 1969, Yale Law School. - Ed. Some of the insights and some of the oneliners in this essay I owe to Joel Dobris. I benefited also from conversations with Tom Grey and
Bob Weisberg.
1. One problem is the briefcase - is the briefcase still the mark of an expert? Is the Filofax?
Laptop? Cellular telephone?
2. I don't think there is a New University of Cosmetology in a concrete block building on
Van Nuys Boulevard, but these days, I wouldn't bet on it. If there is one, please have your
lawyer send the letter of groveling apology to my home address and I will sign and dispatch it by
return mail.
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door. Under the circumstances, it's a caution when you find scholars
still doing what they were brought up to do: philosophers doing philosophy, literary critics doing literature, or lawyers doing law.
This reflection on the bureaucratics of academic life will help to
situate, and make sense of, that field wretchedly misnamed "law and
literature." Despite the increasing currency of the term, no single field
of inquiry deserves that name. 3 Presently, several disparate topics
sometimes pass, singly or severally, under that name. These include:
1. The study of works of literature (typically novels) for the light
they may throw on ethical questions. A well-known recent example is
Richard Weisberg's The Failure of the Word. 4
2. The study of the method whereby the reader interprets the text
- including the study of whether any such interpretation is possible at
all. This is the central topic of Stanley Fish's Doing What Comes Naturally, one of the subjects of this review. 5
3. The study of argumentation, anciently known as "rhetoric."6
The vast range of examples here almost defies enumeration: from
straightforward "instrumental" manuals on exposition, like Richard
Wydick's Plain English for Lawyers, 7 through far more ambitious
studies on the place of rhetoric in human affairs. 8
4. The study of human self-definition. This fourth line of inquiry
has aspirations which are far more ambitious, if not any more obscure,
than the others, and thus is far more likely to escape notice. This
approach argues that we are (in large measure) what we imagine ourselves to be, and law and literature are alike methods of defining who
we are and how we live in the world. This theme lurks in the literature of the left, but its reach is far more extensive and its politics far
more equivocal. The most obvious proponent of this view in the literature of the law would be James Boyd White. 9
These four lines of inquiry often overlap and, at the right level of
abstraction, may be amenable to unification. Thus, both interpretation
and rhetoric may be understood as "ethical" activities, and the making
of ethical decisions may comprehend the act of self-definition. But for
the most part, they are discussed separately (even if between the same
3. For an argument that there is such a field, see Ge=ette, Law and Literature: An Unnecessarily Suspect Class in the Liberal Arts Component of the Law School Curriculum, 23 VAL. U.
L. REv. 267 (1989).
4. R. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION (1984).
5. See infra Part II.
6. After Aristotle, of course.
7. R. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (2d ed. 1985).
8. See, e.g., THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (J. Nelson, A. Megill & D. Mccloskey eds. 1987).
9. See, e.g., J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
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book covers), and certainly no modern consensus exists on how, if at
all, they might be brought into coordination.
What these inquiries do have in common, and what brings them
together under the heading of "law and literature," is not so much
intellectual as structural or institutional: they represent the convergence between people who draw their paychecks through the law
school and those who are employed down the hall (or around the
block) in the Department of English. In academic life, bureaucracy is
destiny. The people you go to lunch with, the people with whom you
wrangle over appointments, promotions, and even secretarial help, are
the people who shape the universe of thought in which you reside what Stanley Fish would call your "interpretive community."
Clearly, the boundaries of that community are shifting today. Fish
and Richard Posner, whose new books I discuss in this review, represent two remarkable modern instances of how, and with what consequence, this process may occur.
II

"I don't know who it was that discovered water, but I know it
wasn't a fish." Which I take to mean: you will not be conscious of
those things of which you are unconscious. Or, more sedately: it is
virtually impossible to understand, when you are resting on a presupposition, what that presupposition might be. For present purposes,
this old wheeze is true in only the most limited sense. If to be a "discoverer," you must be the first to know something, then Stanley Fish
certainly did not discover the presupposition; others have discovered it
before him, right back to the beginning of history. But if you accept
the idea in a broader sense, then it is not unfair to regard Fish as the
Columbus of this New World- the man who introduced a generation
of law-academics to just how tightly bound we all are by our assumptions, and how difficult it is even to identify, let alone to articulate and
understand them.
Fish is also one of the more conspicuous examples of the new
world of academic claim-jumping outlined above. In his youth he labored away in the back forty,.. of the literary plantation, chopping critical cornstalks and grubbing academic tubers out of the pastures of the
seventeenth century: Milton, most notably, but also George Herbert
and other lesser morsels. 10
Along the way, Fish hit upon two principles that formed the basis
for a far less constrained academic career. The first insight is that if
you write like you talk - talk to your friends, that would be, on the
basketball court or in the chili parlor - then getting published is not
10. See, e.g., S. FISH, SURPRISED BY SIN: THE READER IN "PARADISE LOST''
FISH, THE LIVING TEMPLE: GEORGE HERBERT AND CATECHIZING (1978).

(1967); S.
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only no harder, but actually a good deal easier. You get in print more
often, you have a broader audience, and one suspects you have a much
easier time getting the stuff off your desk - seeing as how you can
ship out most of what you produce pretty much as it comes from the
dictaphone. 11
The second insight was far more momentous, and, for Fish, must
have been far more surprising. Much of his early (or at least his "middle") work qualified as, if you use that kind of language, metatheory
- theory about theory, the study of how it is that stories, etc., get
created and translated. Fish was hardly alone in this endeavour, of
course; in the literary world, the swamps and bogs of metatheory are
at least as crowded (one wants to say "suffocating") as the windswept
escarpments of the Milton stake. What Fish discovered (how, I do not
know 12) was the whole universe next door, where academics were better paid, where publication outlets were far more plentiful, where
scholarly standards were far more elastic, 13 and where people didn't
have the slightest clue about how to play the metatheory game. And
the wonder of it is that they cared what he was up to, that they
thought he was cute, and fun. For generations, law professors had
given themselves sour stomachs over the problem of explication du
texts, although they certainly didn't have that name for it. Quite the
contrary, nothing in legal circles had gone much further than the notion that judicial opinion sometimes might be dictated by "hunch." 14
Fish must have felt like Professor Harold Hill when he discovered the
pool table. Now at last, he could walk through a field full of texts
barefoot and never get so much as a callous.
Fish practices his craft largely, although not entirely, along the
lines set forth in the second category above: the study of strategies for
the interpretation of texts. He is the founder, or at least the proprietor, of the idea of the "interpretive community" - the notion that all
meaning is context-bound, energized and limited by the society from
which it emerges. Fish outlined the doctrine in an important book
published in 1980, 15 to which Doing What Comes Naturally can be
regarded as a sequel. The point of the "interpretive community" is to
11. The dictaphone is even more dated than the briefcase, I know. But remember, this all
started 20 years or so ago.
12. But see infra text accompanying note 60.
13. Certainly it must seem so. If you have never tried it, imagine what it is like to encounter
the mixture of incredulity and greed that you inspire when you, as a law professor, tell a professor of English (say) that we let students make publication decisions. Surely, it is an exquisite
form of humiliation to have some infant who can't earn a C in criminal law tell you that you
really don't grasp the contours of mens rea. But for anyone who has suffered under the vengefulness and pomposity of a peer review system, the regime of the law review must look like a sinful
indulgence.
14. See, e.g., Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of "Hunch" in the Judicial
Decision, 14 CoRNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
15. S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980).
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provide an escape from "formalism," or "foundationalism," or any
similar doctrine of fixed meaning, without plunging into the abyss of
nihilism. Whether it succeeds or not is, of course, the issue to which
we will return later.
This is Fish's doctrine, and he presents it with gusto, as I shall try
to demonstrate later. Oddly, this is about all of it. I say "oddly,"
because Fish's critique, if correct, is really only a beginning. Fish
writes as if he is writing about readers and texts. But if Fish is anywhere near right about his "strong-form" interpretive communities,
then interpretation is not merely a matter of rhetoric; it is something
far more. Truly, what Fish is describing are the ways we not only find
but also make our world. Humans thus function as "self-interpreting
animals,"16 and what Fish is studying are "ways of worldmaking." 17
If you like Fish's argument, this is exactly what you would hope for; if
you dislike it, it is what you would fear or suspect. But, in either
event, you will have to go elsewhere for the larger implications. With
Fish, you are limited to a presentation, however forceful or elegant, of
the narrower case.
Doing What Comes Naturally bears the subtitle "Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies." That
covers three concepts and two fields: six permutations by my count,
enough to suggest a suspicious catholicity in the criterion of inclusion.
And I surmise that only a person with a rarified taste (other than a
commissioned reviewer) would care both about how Dennis Martinez'
philosophy of baseball informs Mark Kelman's elucidation of Roberto
Unger (ch. 17) and about what Waddington said in 1972 about what
Lewis said in 1942 about what Milton said in 1667 about the Devil. 18
The book's inclusiveness is partly a matter of style, I suspect; Fish
probably likes being thought of as the kind of with-it guy who can tell
you stories about Dennis Martinez 19 and Randy Newman20 just as
well as he can about John Milton. 21 You can almost picture a little
stone church up in the Berkeley hills somewhere (the First Church of
Stanley?) with one of those black notice boards out front saying "Sunday! 'Strikes, Balls, and Immortality,' the Rev. S. Fish, prop., the
Hippy Preacher who Talks to the Young."
Perhaps inevitably, given the conventions of current academic
16. The phrase is Charles Taylor's. See C. TAYLOR, Self-Interpreting Animals, in I PHILO·
SOPHICAL PAPERS: HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 45 (1985).
17. The phrase is Nelson Goodman's. See N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WoRLDMAKING (1978).
18. Ch. 12. The captious reader might suggest that it takes a rarified taste to care about
either of them, but let that be.
19. The ballplayer. See ch. 17.
20. The singer-songwriter. See ch. 9.
21. The essayist and poet. See chs. 12, 18, 20. Fish does seem to understand that it is more
likely a Milton fan will be reading Fish on Martinez than a Martinez fan will be reading Fish on
Milton, and provides identifying data accordingly.
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writing, something like eighty percent of it has been previously published, perhaps half in the law reviews. Indeed, the very fact that you
have joined that tiny sliver of humanity actually reading this review
suggests that you probably have photocopied a few of these chapters
already and placed them in a cardboard carton in the corner, perhaps
bearing the inscription "TO BE READ SOMEDAY" in water-soluble
Magic Marker. 22 Doing What Comes Naturally is billed as one (the
first?) of a series called "Post-Contemporary Interventions," the editors of which are Fredric Jameson23 and (surprise!) Stanley Fish.24
"At last," you might say, "together in one convenient place." No,
I was kidding. You wouldn't say it, but the publisher's publicist
might. And she would have missed the point. Work like Fish's may
lose just as much as it gains by "collected" publication. Virtually
everything Fish writes is part of a conversation, or at the very least a
context, and you can't really appreciate it unless you see the context as
a whole.
To stress the "conversational" nature of Fish's work can hardly be
a complaint - as Fish would delight in explaining, the whole academic enterprise is in its essence conversational. But the mode of presentation defeats, or belies, the premise upon which it purports to rest.
You only get half the story here - Fish's answer to X, his comment
on Y, and so forth. Certainly Fish summarizes his opponents, and not
always unfairly. But they never get a chance to speak for themselves.
The absence of context might be a problem with anyone, but it. is a
special problem with Fish. It is rooted in - I almost said his "style,"
but style in the sense that style is the man. Indeed, Fish's whole epistemology is built around localized, particular thought. The most cursory survey makes the point. His adversaries frequently appear in
chapter titles. 25 Aside from his titles, in fully fifteen out of the twentytwo chapters, there is a proper name in the first sentence - not always .
an adversary, sometimes a conversation partner or the subject of a
22. Is this another trademark term? Why can't I do without them today?
23. An odd match: Fish the ebullient relativist with Jameson, the high priest of Marxist
essentialism. Fish seems to recognize the disparity. See p. 501 ("Jameson opens up the narrativity of history in order to proclaim one narrative the true and unifying one."). But the principle of
portfolio diversification presumably works here the same as it does in a law firm: not even the
WASPiest law firm limits itself to an all-Republican partnership.
24. Fish's role as the editor of a series does not mean he is going soft on the establishment.
Discussing the craving for "theory" in literary studies, he says:
Theory will stop only when it has played out its string . . . . This is already happening in
literary studies, and there could be no surer sign of it than the appearance in recent years of
several major anthologies ... and of series that bear titles like New Accents but report only
on what is old and well digested.
Pp. 340-41. The point sounds very much like a "literary" version of the efficient capital market
hypothesis - the idea that once packaged in a series, it is, by definition, no longer interesting or
important.
25. See chs. 2, 3, 6, 13, 17, 18.
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story, but a specific, identified human being nonetheless. 26 And it's
not just the other fellow: Fish is not at all shy about the first person
singular. The preface begins: "I can imagine ... " (p. ix). In individual chapters, we have "Nothing I wrote ... " (p. 315) and "I was led to
this paper by ... " (p. 525). And inevitably, author and subject sometimes make it to the first sentence together: "In the summer of 1977,
as I was preparing to teach Jacques Derrida's Of Grammatology .. ."
(p. 37); "I propose to take Roberto Unger as seriously ... " (p. 399);
"Before turning to Ronald Dworkin's response to my critique, I would
like ... " (p. 103).
Fish is not only unabashedly personal, be is cheerfully anecdotal.
Chapters begin at a particular time: "In the summer of 1977, as I ... "
(p. 37); "In September 1982 columnist Peter A. Jay ... " (p. 197); "In
1972 Raymond Waddington ... " (p. 247); "On June 24, 1985, Dennis
Martinez ... " (p. 372). Or, almost as specific: "Not too many years
ago Randy Newman ... " (p. 180); "In the past twenty years ... " (p.
342); "Every so often one hears ... " (p. 215) - only a breath away
from "once upon a time." Just as he localizes you in time, Fish also
likes to localize you in place, or at least in a particular document. We
have: "In bis essay Law as Interpretation Ronald Dworkin ... " (p.
87); "On the first page of bis essay Objectivity and Interpretation Owen
Fiss ... " (p. 120); "In an essay entitled "The Construal of Reality,"
Stephen Toulmin ... " (p. 436); "In the opening chapters of his magisterial study, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart ... " (p. 503).
Finally, aside from the details of structure and syntax, consider the
overall title: Doing What Comes Naturally. Fish seems to think his
choice is more or less fortuitous; as if the book could just as well have
been entitled, say, The Number One Best Seller, or Bird Thou Never
Wert. The fact, of course, is quite otherwise: in this book Fish does
exactly what comes naturally; indeed it is hard to picture him doing
anything else. Birds gotta fly, as the fellow says, fish gotta swim. Fish
needs to swim in the mainstream of literary shoptalk, where there are
conferences and grants and cocktail parties and nice little restaurants
and sympathetic journals, and even (oh, rapture!) a series with a sympathetic editor who keeps his editorial scissors locked in the bottom
drawer out of harm's way. Someone once asked an old editor what he
liked to read. "Read?" (harrumph). "Well, yes, Dickens, of course,
and the Bible, oh yes, the Holy Writ, the Song of Songs, our little
sister has no breasts, that sort of thing. But most of all I like to crawl
down between the sheets and read me Own Stuff/" This is a believable, but not an inevitable, reaction. ,Some people react with revulsion
to their Own Stuff, but others like to run it through their fingers, slap
it up against the wall, anything to reexperience the moment of
creativity.
26. See chs. 2-6, 9-10, 12-13, 16-21. He waits until the second sentence in chapters 1 and 22.
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Thus Fish's internal approach is nearly always "dialectical" in the
Socratic, as distinct from the Marxist, sense of the term, 27 as he tries
to nail the other guy's butt to the wall in a rhetorical half nelson. It's
all real enough: you wouldn't say that he's faking it like the guys in
the Friday night wrestling. On the other hand, you wouldn't call him
really contentious, either; he's so good-natured about it all, and you
get the sense that he doesn't pick on people smaller than he is. The
picture is rather one of a basically sociable eleven-year-old who finds
roughhousing to be an essential form of human contact.28
This is refreshing, at least for a time, and it has a number of practical virtues. For one, by stating things in context, you always know
exactly what the fight is about. Almost any idea makes sense only in
terms of what it is not. Take a more austere, structured work like
Rawls' A Theory of Justice, for example, and the enemy is always offstage. 29 Unless you are adept at the whole tradition of social philosophy, you don't know where to begin. By contrast, no one will ever
have to write a guide called "Understanding Fish." 30 Situating himself among his friends and his enemies, he saves you all the trouble.
Second, in this case at least, the style is clearly the man. Fish's
world is particular, personal, concrete: a world of lived lives, where
people dream up projects for themselves, and then succeed or fail at
them; a world of dreamers and charlatans, of loyalties and betrayals.
In this world, people have ideas and take responsibility for them, and
ideas matter enough to be worth talking about. It is a world, in short,
where rhetoric makes a difference.31
So what is the problem with the style? There are several. The first
problem is that by embracing the concrete, Fish misses precisely those
virtues that belong to the abstract. When Rawls tells us that "[i]ustice
is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of
thought," 32 it may require an exercise of cogitation or exposition to
know what he means by "justice," "virtue," "social institutions,"
"truth," and "thought." But at least you have that darling of the oldstyle composition teacher, the Topic Sentence, by which to gauge the
27. And as distinct from the Platonic. It's the Socrates of, say, the Protagoras, where adversaries still dust it up with each other, rather than the Socrates of, say, the Republic, where people
seem to spend their whole time saying "yes, Socrates," and "no, Socrates," and "now you're
cooking, Socrates."
28. Maybe a better metaphor is the knight in the Monty Python movie who insists on going
on with the fight even after his arms, legs, and body have been cut off.
29. J. RAWIS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Patricia White tells a wonderful story about
the collapse of the Rawls market at a particular school, as insufficiently prepared students discovered they simply didn't get the point. White, Teaching Philosophy ofLaw in Law Schools: Some
Cautionary Remarks, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 563, 564-65 (1986).
30. Cf R. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS (1977).
31. For a close examination of the Fish style qua style, see Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of
the Relatively Autonomous Self. 76 GEO. L.J. 37 (1987).
32. J. RAWLS, supra note 29, at 3.
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text. With Fish's discussion of Randy Newman or Dennis Martinez,
you have good stories, but it is not always so clear what the stories tell.
Fish seems to try to rectify this defect in an introductory chapter
that has a certain instructive irony all its own. One immediately notable feature of this chapter is stylistic; unlike the chatty familiarity of
the other chapters, this first chapter begins with a tone of stem academic formalism that is almost a parody of another kind of academic
writing, quite different from Fish's. 33 Thus, unlike all the displays of
anecdote in the later chapters, Fish's Chapter 1 begins: "It is one of
the theses of this book that many of the issues in interpretive theory
can be reduced to a few basic questions in the philosophy of language." (p. 1). No "I"; "it is." No anecdote; a "thesis." No appeal to
another person or event, but rather to the austere abstraction of the
"philosophy of language."
Now, the second sentence of this same first chapter: "Consider,
for example, the discussion of 'presupposition' in Ruth Kempson's
Presupposition and the Delimitation ofSemantics. 34 Ruth who? Oh, it
isn't important. Anyway, the mind is occupied in trying to remember
what a "presupposition" might be; also a "delimitation," just as if
reading Rawls. Fish continues from there with a page and a half of
e~position, most of it direct quotation from Kempson, the rest a seemingly conscientious effort at paraphrase.
But then, on page two: "[O]nce you start down the anti-formalist
road, there is no place to stop ... " (p. 2). Argh, the poor fellow, he
just couldn't help himself. A page and a half of abstraction (and most
of that, direct quotes) and we are back to the quintessential Stanleychatty and informal. If there is any doubt, the next paragraph, begins:
"I would not be misunderstood" (p. 3) - only the first appearance of
the first person pronoun in the essay, ending what is very nearly the
most remarkable instance of self-abnegation in the entire book. But
now, the mask is off: there are five more "I's" and three "my's" in the
next paragraph. (Okay, I didn't count every word, but take a look for
yourself and see if I don't get the drift.)
In other words, it's a trick, that sober beginning. A spoof, of
course, harmless in itself, but it does give Fish a chance for something
very close to a topic sentence: "[R]emove the connection between observable features and the specification of meaning, and you also remove everything else that is supposedly independent of context;
entailment, contradiction, grammaticality itself, all become as variable
and contingent as presupposition" (p. 2).
Enter, then, Fish, accompanied by the "interpretive community"
- or "communities," given the richness and complexity of modem
33. Indeed, for a few moments, I wondered if Fish was going to offer a little anthology of
pastiche, on the order of James Joyce in Ulysses.
34. P.l; R. KEMPSON, PRESUPPOSITION AND THE DELIMITATION OF SEMANTICS (1975).
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experience. Such communities create and energize, but they also govern, language (and thus thought). In Fish's analysis, the notion serves
to solve the problem of meaning, but it solves the problem of meaninglessness, as well. "[T]he question 'is everything then indeterminate?'
lpses its force," says Fish, "because it would make just as much sense
to say that everything is determinate" (p. 83).
In its mild form, this is a perfectly innocuous idea. But Fish does
not take it in its mild form. He really means it. In Fish's eyes, everything is context-bound ("entailment, contradiction, grammaticality itself . . .") (p. 2). In this strong form, the assertion is far more
contentious. Thus, for example, it may be obvious that his "relativism"35 is going to be a weapon against "right" 36 thinkers like Posner.
But Fish emphatically applies it just as well to self-conceived "left"
theorists like Robert Gordon, Mark Kelman, and Duncan Kennedy,
whose critical X-ray vision, in many ways so like Fish's own, seems to
lose its focus once they have transferred their scrutiny from the establishment and trained it on revolution. 37 After 554 pages of Fish (plus
a selection of his adversaries), either you believe it or you do not. I
happen to believe it, but then I pretty much did before I read the book,
so mine may not be a very considered judgment. On the other hand, I
can make a number of points around the periphery to clarify or inform
Fish's argument.
One concerns the matter of antecedents. In that first sentence, previously quoted, Fish says that "many of the issues in interpretive theory can be reduced to a few basic questions in the philosophy of
language" (p. 1; emphasis added). This is not precisely wrong, but it
is misleading almost to the point of perversity. Yes, they are issues in
"the philosophy of language," in a broad sense. But they are equally
issues of anthropology, of sociology, of political science - in short, of
epistemology itself (if there is such a thing) as an effort to create foundations for knowledge. I am not clear why Fish singled out the philosophy of language for special honors on page one: perhaps mere
fortuity because he had Ruth Kempson's book at hand, or perhaps
because Kempson made a convenient subject for harmless merriment,
like Margaret Dumond in a Marx Brothers comedy.
In any event, the issue does not begin or end with the philosophy
of language. The idea of the primacy of the presupposition far antedates Fish and his work. Fish, of course, knows this. At various
places in the book, he cheerfully introduces other stalwarts of the antifoundationalist company, like Thomas Kuhn, J.L. Austin, and Richard Rorty (whom he calls "a champion of ... antiessentialism ... "). 38
35.
36.
37.
38.

My word, not Fish's.
Me again.
See pp. 226-30.
P. 501. For Kuhn, see especially pp. 486-88. For Austin, see especially pp. 37-61. Fish's

1594

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:1584

But these references are casual, improvisational - the way you would
expect to get introduced to your kids' housemates when you came to
call. A more comprehensive lineage would have mentioned Wittgenstein, for heaven's sake. 39 Or Nietzsche. Or any of a number of combatants, right back to the Sophists. It is like the dance of the seven
veils: every time you remove a veil, there are seven more behind.40•
If the battle is so old, and the combatants so numerous, one might
well ask why Fish keeps up the fight? There seem to be several reasons. One, obvious enough, is that the anti-foundationalists never really seem to carry the day: essentialism rears its head, one place or
another, over and over. A second, for Fish I suspect, is sheer sociability. Conflict is a form of intimacy, and he likes to be down there on
the field where he can feel the crack of bodies. A third is that Fish is
so blessed good at it. He knows how to identify, and make hash out of,
the ultimate foundationalist argument: the one that says, look, you
guys can't be right. Otherwise, why go on? This is the gist of his
tussle with poor Ruth Kempson. She says, in effect, that any theory
which rests on anti-foundationalist premises must of necessity be a
pretty inconvenient theory and therefore "must be relinquished" (p. 2;
quoting Kempson). Once Fish sees that one coming, he lays into it
with almost indecent glee.4t
As to the game itself: Fish is ready to play this game on the flimsiest excuse with just about anybody. But his most extensive and, to my
mind, most interesting argument is with Ronald Dworkin. Fish and
Dworkin are interesting, surely in part because both have been so willing to return to the fray, defining and refining their own positions.
Fish persists in catching Dworkin off base in presuming a kind of certainty that he persistently denies. For his part, Dworkin clearly (and
quite rightly) understands that anti-foundationalism can be an invitation to all kinds of vulgar hooliganism. He and Fish have been engaged in a running debate42 over the issue that is instructive by any
measure; clearly, Dworkin and Fish need each other like King Pellibook is littered with acknowledgments of this sort, betraying the kind of overlap you have to
expect from collected essays, but which can be so discomfiting to the reader. I wonder if Fish
knows or cares that he used the same quotation (from Israel Scheffler) three times at three different places, always to make the same point. See pp. 322 & 487, both of which appear in the index,
and p. 345, which does not.
39. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. Anscomb trans. 1953). Richard Posner, in the other book under review here, dismisses Fish as "deploying an analytical
apparatus that he got from Wittgenstein." R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 263 (1988).
40. For an admirable summary of this philosophical tradition in law, see Grey, Holmes and
Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 791-815 (1989).
41. Posner leaves himself open to virtually the same objection. "Skepticism is an interesting
and perhaps irrefutable philosophical stance," he says, "but, when pushed as far as Fish pushes
it, one incapable of guiding action or interpretation." R. POSNER, supra note 39, at 263-64.
42. See infra note 47.
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nore and the Questing Beast. 43
In Fish's current book, Dworkin comes under scrutiny in three
chapters and part of a fourth. 44 Sometimes he is dealing with Dworkin "as he is generally understood." 45 But the reader who really wants
to understand what is going on is left to his own devices to fill in the
Dworkin gap. This is a serious shortcoming even though, as I say, I
think Fish gets the better of the argument. The point, of course, is
that nothing is more instructive than a competent failure, and if Dworkin can't succeed, not much of anyone can. Indeed, rather than read
Fish straight through, one might be well advised to get a copy of
Dworkin's A Matter of Principle 46 to go with Fish, and read the original articles in sequence. Better, if you still have the Fish originals in
that cardboard "to-be-read" box, you probably have the Dworkins
there, too. 47 What you want to do is to get out one of those big, black,
beetly paperclips and bind them all together in order. The temptation
will be overwhelming to put them into a brown manila envelope with
the inscription "TO BE READ - DWORKIN-FISH." Resist the
temptation. This is the best debate on interpretation going.
I've already said that I think Fish gets the better of it. But as Fish
would surely concede, Dworkin gives him the toughest time, which is
reason enough to pay attention. But beyond the core argument, there
are a couple of propositions on which Fish is either suffering from
polemical blindness or flatly wrong.
In discussing the manner of "interpretation," Dworkin seems to
want to distinguish between judges (in the 1810s, say), who are "unconstrained" in that they have no past practice to bind them, and
others (in the 1980s, say), who are constrained by such a past. Wrong,
says Fish: you are always constrained, in the sense that life always
comes to you interpreted, predetermined. And you are always uncon43. That would be T.H. WHITE, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING (1958) (le., the post-Disney
segment). Readers will remember that when the Beast thought Pellinore was dead, it languished
almost to extinction. They needed each other like, well, Dworkin and Fish.
44. Ch. 4, "Working on the Chain Gang"; ch. 5, "Wrong Again"; ch. 16, "Still Wrong after
All These Years"; and ch. 17, "Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory." By putting two
chapters near the beginning of the book and two at the end, Fish seems to feel he has recast the
debate into a larger framework. He is mistaken. They are still best read as prescribed here.
45. This is a steal from a story I heard years ago about Professor Friedrich Kessler at Yale.
"How would Wittgenstein approach the issue?" Kessler asked the student. "Do you mean the
early Wittgenstein," the student parried, "or the late?" "Oh," said Kessler, "just Wittgenstein as
he is generally understood."
46. See R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE chs. 6-7 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 527 (1982), reprinted in
THE PoLmcs OF INTERPRETATION 249 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983); R. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at
146 (as "How Law is Like Literature"); see also Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter
Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk about Objectivity Anymore, in THE PoLmcs OF INTERPRETATION, supra, at 287. The original Dworkin-Fish exchange appeared in 9 CRmCAL INQUIRY
179 (1982) and 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 201 (1982). A revised version ofDworkin's response is in
R. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 167 (as "On Interpretation and Objectivity").
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strained in that you can choose whether or not to be bound by a particular practice.
I think Fish is right on both particulars, but I think his polemical
enthusiasm carries him past two essential subtleties. For one, granting
that I am always constrained, there are still vast differences in the way
that I may understand myself as being constrained: sometimes I may
(choose to?) be aware of my past, sometimes not. Sometimes I may
(choose to?) rebel against it, sometimes not. The differences are palpable, and, I think important. Fish apparently would disagree: he devotes a fair-sized chapter 48 to arguing that "theory," as he defines it,
makes no difference - nada, zero, bupkas, zilch - which would seem
to exclude precisely the kind of distinction that I am insisting on here.
I must say I found this material the least persuasive in the book, and
not at all essential to his main argument. Fish seems to show only that
the effects of this kind of self-consciousness are unpredictable, or at
least very hard to predict. Fish evidently thinks of this as a "retreat"
from a "strong" position on theory to a "weak" one (p. 331). I would
have called it an "advance" from a "weak" position on theory to a
"strong" one. To say that a position is untenable because it is difficult
or elusive is no answer at all: it is very close to the position of Fish's
critics who say that the world can't be as he describes it, because all
that would be too inconvenient.
Fish also overlooks another possibility with Dworkin, although
concededly it is not the kind of possibility that Dworkin would take as
a compliment. Specifically, Fish's charge against Dworkin is an indictment for aggravated ambivalence: that Dworkin insists and persists on running with the hare while hunting with the hounds - that
he tries to be an essentialist and an anti-essentialist, all at once. But
suppose (as I imply) that Fish is right? Where are we? The leftists
seem to assume self-evidently that "contradiction" is a disabling vice;
and Dworkin himself certainly strives for consistency and coherence,
nothing less. But at the end of the day, Dworkin's "ambivalence" may
remain as, if not the most respectable, the most interesting thing about
him.
With other commentators, Fish does a respectable but ultimately
somewhat more tedious job.49 There are some interesting insights.
Fish offers a fine short summary of Unger's Knowledge and Politics
(pp. 404-11 ). Also, Fish the Milton scholar shows the ultimately absolutist character of Unger's (like Milton's) thought. And he savors the
irony of a scholar who begins with a clarion call to "politics" and ends
with an anguished entreaty to "God." On others - Fiss, for example,
or Hart - he does his usual stunt, but after a while, it sounds routine.
I've probably said enough here to make clear my bottom-line judg48. Ch. 14; see also chs. 15, 17.
49. Ch. 6. The text is Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
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ment on Fish: right as I think he is, I think it is time that he wrote
another book, and this time, a different one, perhaps in the hands of a
more detached and skeptical editor. There are any number he is up to:
grand metaphysics, I suppose, or baseball. But I should note one possibility that is tucked away in the interstices of the current collection,
ripe to be dusted off and spruced up for presentation in its own light.
Fish shows that he can be one of the funniest, because most accurate,
commentators on the political and social conventions of the academic
life. It's essential to his point, of course: in order to understand the
idea of an "interpretive community," you have to know what one is,
and how it works. Fish does some of his best work fleshing it out. He
has a priceless essay on receiving a book by Derrida carrying a card
inscribed "with the compliments of the author" (ch. 2). He comes up
with half a dozen or more possible sources and meanings, including
one where Derrida says "Stanley Who?" He's equally good on how he
fell behind on his dues to the Spenser Society before he knew there was
such a thing (pp. 169-72). And more in that vein. If Fish is disposed
to do more of that sort of thing, I count myself as an expectant, even
an eager, market.
Speaking of "markets," let me make just one more point about
Fish, this by way of transition. I indicated above that Fish strikes me
as a good-natured sort of roughhouse, and that however sharp his
jibes, I suspect he isn't really eager to wound. But there is one exception: one case where Fish seems to work up a Johnsonian kind of
indignation, and to let loose with something close to fury. 50 "[A]
slight and flawed piece," says Fish, "full of misinformation and blunders . . . uncomprehending of the positions to which it is opposed,
finally less an argument than a collection of outdated pieties" (p. 310).
That is, to put it mildly, atypical Fish, harsher, more savage, than
anything else in the book. He saves that kind of abuse for the other
subject of this review, Richard Posner.

III
The way I heard it was this: Posner was visiting at a major law
school one year when he complained he didn't seem to be making any
friends. From out of the bowels of the common room, a voice
growled: "Why don't you buy a friend?"
Sad to say, it appears not to be true. Just lately I talked to a chap
who claims (plausibly, I think) to have originated the jibe. He says it
wasn't Posner at all but Aaron Director, the spiritual grandfather of
that brand of economics of which Posner is only an offshoot. I guess it
stands to reason. Director was, by many accounts, a proud sort of guy
50. See, e.g., Johnson, Review of Soame Jenyns, A Free Enquiry into the Nature and Origin
of Evil, LITERARY MAGAZINE (1757) reprinted in 7 WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 217 (1912).
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with a good knack for hurt feelings. Posner, by contrast, is at home
anywhere, ready to be (as they said of Teddy Roosevelt) the bride at
every wedding, the corpse at every funeral. Not the kind of guy who
would have to think about purchasing friendship.
Except, as they say, academically. For Posner certainly is the chap
who holds (with only mild vulgarization) that there can be a market
for anything, and that the world will be a better, happier place if only
you create one - a world where, as we used to say of the bankruptcy
court, there are no problems that money can't solve.
Taken in context, Posner's success at putting himself on the
agenda is no mean feat. One of the great risks of the cross-disciplinary
academic is that he becomes what the feminists and the lefties call
"marginalized":51 critspeak for "out of the action," like the kid with
the Coke-bottle glasses who always gets picked last in the sandlot softball game. 52 At the beginning of his career, Posner risked marginalization in a big way: he not only risked doing economics in the law
school, he did it unencumbered by proper credentials. 53 Nonetheless,
Posner virtually created the subdiscipline of "law and economics," or
better, "law-and-economics," or still better, "lawandeconomics." The
result is legal scholarship as we see it before us today. And of all the
charges you might hurl at Posner now, "marginalized" is not among
them. Not content with merely organizing the province, he populated
it as well, in (already) one of the most productive careers that ever an
academic enjoyed. Posner almost certainly exceeds any other modem
scholar, both in terms of amount written and in terms of amount written about. But marginalization is not the only possible fate (or status)
of the cross-disciplinary scholar. He might flourish, perhaps by functioning (and perhaps quite successfully) as a simple garden-variety
fraud who picks, for example, an obscure topic in an obscure language
and speaks loudly where there is no one around to contradict him,
stultus in eruditis, eruditus in stultus. 54 Still another possibility for the
51. You will see ifl am right if you run "marginalized" or its equivalents through Westlaw
or Lexis. Go ahead. Try it.
52. I suspect that an important reason for the appeal of "marginalization" is that most "soft"
academics (humanities, social sciences, law) were kids with thick glasses and no knack for softball (present company agonizingly included). Heaven knows how the world would be different if
just a few of them had ever gotten out of right field.
53. An acquaintance of mine who is a major player in another brand of interdisciplinary
scholarship, when asked, "where did you train?" likes to answer, "On the john."
54. "A fool among scholars and a scholar among fools." In fact, I don't know any Latin; I
got my research assistant, Steve Hanken, to scare this up. But I thought it added the right note
of brooding portent. As for perpetrating cross-boundary fraud, I suspect that too much
(although not all) of comparative law is guilty, and always has been. Of course, I am not certain,
because I do not know the language, nor do I know the topic. But if you spend any time in the
sidewalk cafes along the Mediterranean, listening to European academics expatiate on American
law, you come away with two things: (1) a favorable disposition toward the indigenous food,
drink, and climate; and (2) a deep-seated skepticism about the whole comparative-law enterprise.
Of course, I do not in the least way mean to single out European academics for opprobrium here.
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cross-disciplinary scholar is that he can make the creative breakthrough - demonstrating, say, that linguistics really does have something to say about archaeology, or geology about animal evolution, or
whatever.
The last possible fate, more elusive and intractable than the rest, is
the situation where you just can't tell what the guy is worth. You
can't put your finger on the right - well, the right "interpretive community" - to evaluate it against. Even if you have to accept that he
isn't a fraud, you may be able to avoid declaring him a genius because
there is no one around who can convincingly certify him as a genius.
As a scholar of law and economics, Posner seems to me to fall into this
last category. You simply cannot convincingly dismiss him as a fraud
- although heaven knows, the faculty clubs are full of sulky professors who would cheerfully push their grandmothers in front of a train
for the privilege of doing so.
There is no doubt at all that he sets the agenda and dominates the
debate. But dominating the debate is not quite the same as carrying
the day. Whenever the Posner juggernaut steams through, aside from
the true dissenters, a much larger contingent of careful and critical
commentators always is on hand to say, "Well now, it's just not that
simple ...." 55
Part of the problem is the sheer volume. Anyone who writes faster
than most people read is bound to leave readers more out of breath
than out of words. But it is more than that. For while it is not often
remarked upon, Posner in fact fits rather well into a tradition of Anglo-American intellectuals whom we have all come to know and not
entirely to trust. I am thinking of Herbert Spencer, for one. 56 And
more particularly, Jeremy Bentham. 57
Bentham, Spencer, and Posner are alike in a number of respects,
they are cheerful and fluent, they swim the stream of their times, they
make a difference. But with both Bentham and Spencer, at least, it is
clear in retrospect that they did not ge~ it quite right. A student of
There is every reason to believe that the problem is transcultural. The spiritual progenitor here is
not the Wizard of Oz, but rather more the king or the duke from Huckleberry Finn.
55. See, e.g., Brennan, Mistaken Elasticities and Misleading Rules, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1849
(1982); Hovenkamp, The Economics of Legal History, 67 MINN. L. REv. 645 (1983); Kaplow,
The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95
HARV. L. REv. 1817 (1982); Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95 HARV. L. REv.
1789 (1982).
56. Suggestive of Spencer's place in social thought is the relative paucity of recent commentary, contrasted with the rich store of older material. A modem introduction is J. KENNEDY,
HERBERT SPENCER (1978). For Posner's own appreciative remarks on Spencer, see pp. 284-85.
57. The recent literature on Bentham is far richer. Noteworthy works of direct relevance to
the law include w. Tw!NING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985) and
D. LYONS, IN THE INTERESf OF THE GOVERNED (1973). Posner has gone to some length to
distance himself from Bentham. See, in particular, R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE 3147 (1981).
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mine once said that he didn't think Bentham liked being a human being. I think Bentham may have liked it well enough, but I'm not sure
he knew exactly what it was all about. 58 He played the role of a
human being like George Bush plays the role of a good ol' boy: as if
he learned all the moves just last week in a total-immersion cram
course for foreign visitors. Much the same analysis would seem to
apply to Spencer. And Posner has something of the same tone: cheerful, but not quite good-humored; self-assured, even if not serene.
Probably not as clubbable as, say, Stanley Fish.
So it is no surprise that, when the word got out that Posner was
doing a book on literature, there were sighs of exasperation (oh, not
again!) from the faculty lounge, among the grumbles of envy (how
does he do it?). And a lot of breathy voices whispering: This time will
he get it badly wrong? This time will he fall flat on his face?
The quick answer is: not really. Posner's Law and Literature: A
Misunderstood Relationship, has some real merits and some interesting
insights, although certainly not up to the absurd overpraise on the
jacket.59 But, taking all things together, it's a bit of a mishmash more the first draft of a book than the final product. For the fact is
that Posner, the great simplificateur, has not even the pretense of a
thesis. No, that is too strong. He has the pretense of a thesis - that
the relationship between law and literature is overrated and can be
overdone. But that's pretty thin soup for Posner, and he wasn't able
to do that much until the conclusion, after he had all his evidence
available to survey (pp. 353-64). Before the very end lies an uncharacteristically ill-digested gruel. I will try to explain that point in
some detail below. But in order to understand it, I think we need to
begin by considering just how the book came to be.
Stanley Fish's entry into legal theory seems to have come through
his encounter with Dworkin. 60 Posner's story is similarly specific, but
seemingly more instructive. It starts with Robin West, who wrote a
paper on "authority, autonomy, and choice" in modern life. Quite
aside from the merits of the paper (which are many), West faced a
58. Is it a cheap shot to recall Bentham's enthusiasm for the "auto-icon" - the process of
preserving one's own (or perhaps one's ancestor's) physical remains and having them propped up
around the place as statuary? Bentham directed that his own remains be preserved and displayed
in this way. Apparently the preservation process did not work as well as intended, but at Univer·
sity College, London, his bones (filled out with straw) sit in his original clothes in a glass box.
The head, alas, is a wax replica, but my ex-wife, who normally can be trusted with this sort of
thing, advises that the genuine article did survive, if somewhat the worse for wear, and that if you
say to the guard, "May I see the head?" you will be accommodated. See generally J. DINWIDDY,
BENTHAM (1988).
59. Though what could be? "Lucid, witty, brilliant"; "I am filled with admiration"; "should
be on everyone's bookshelf"; "the most searching and inclusive treatment of the subject I've ever
read." It makes you wonder whether the English professors of America (a) suffer from an epi·
demic of softening of the head, or (b) expect to have business pending shortly in the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
60. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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number of hurdles in seeking publication. She was an unknown beginner at a thoroughly forgettable law school, and she had cast her paper
almost on the model of an undergraduate essay exam: as a comparison between the works of two writers. The two she chose were Franz
Kafka and Richard Posner. 61
Faced with these stiff odds, West got lucky. Twice. First, she got
the paper accepted by the Harvard Law Review - no mean trick at all,
when you reflect that, in the age of the photocopy machine, it is far
harder to get into the Harvard Law Review than it is to get into the
school proper.
Second, she got what every young scholar dreams of - an "attack" (or at least a response) by the Great Man Himself. Harvard
published Posner's "The Ethical Significance of Free Choice," subtitled (sweetness multiplied!) "A Reply to Professor West." 62 West, of
course, has gone on to establish herself as one of the important young
feminist legal scholars. 63 Posner's role in West's career probably can
be understood as a generous gesture. 64 But what interests me is not
the place of Posner in the career of West, but the place of West in the
career of Posner.
For the fact is, the Golden Age of Posnerian law-and-economics
has just about run its course. Oh, certainly, there will continue to be
economics in legal work. One is tempted to say "just as there always
has been," but that implies that law and economics changed nothing.
Of course it changed a great deal, and the world is, at leasf in some
respects, a better place for it. And there will always be someone
around to argue that, say, rich prisoners suffer more than poor prisoners because they have higher opportunity cost. 65 And if some economist wants to sell the argument, some law professor will buy it (the
market at work!). But the recent literature on economics in law exhibits at least three tendencies that augur ill for the Posnerian strain. One
is the emergence of studies which, while ambitious and highly sophisticated in their economics, make a more modest claim for the place of
61. The paper is West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 384 (1985).
62. 99 HARV. L. REv. 1431 (1986). West's response is West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics:
A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1449 (1986).
63. See, e.g., West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's
Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 817 (1986); West, The Authoritarian Impulse in
Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 531 (1988); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
64. The academic grapevine reports that when West was under consideration for a post at
Chicago last year, one of her great advocates was Posner - evidently he likes young people with
spunk. I don't mean to belittle West's work which, as I suggest, has many merits. But one of the
ingredients of success is good luck, and she has had some of it.
65. Lott, Should the Wealthy be Able to ''Buy Justice"?, 95 J. PoL. EcoN. 1307 (1987). This
example came to my attention through Donohue, Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken, 22
LAW & Socv. REv. 903 (1988).
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"economic" solutions in life. The recent work of George Priest is a
conspicuous example. 66 The second is the development of "corporate
finance" - a "dialect" of law and economics, perhaps, but a dialect
with more modest pretensions, more credibly achieved. 67 Finally, a
growing number of articles contribute not merely technical, but broadbased criticisms of law and economics from sophisticated insiders. 68
Even more remarkable, there is a growing body of what you might
call "post-economic" material in the law reviews - material that may
build on, but departs from and goes beyond, economics as conventionally defined. I will be discussing this material after examining Posner's
book in more detail, when I can put it in some kind of context. For
the moment, what all of this amounts to is a demonstration that Posnerian law and economics stands accused of the worst of all academic
or intellectual vices - it has become a bore. 69
I suspect, in other words, that more than the spirit of abstract inquiry prompted Posner's response to West; if you like, you might call
it self-interest. 70 That is, I suspect Posner was smart enough to understand that there wasn't much ore in the old vein and that he didn't
want to be left alone. By responding to West, he established two
things at once. First, he made it clear that he was a hip guy, that no
moss grew on him, so that when someone announced (rightly or
wrongly) the death of law and economics, he could say he knew it all
along. And second, he makes his way into the right Rolodexes, so he
gets cited in the right articles, invited to the right conferences, the
whole works.
Almost certainly, I'm overstating the case here. Posner is, after
all, the very quintessence of a legal academic, and now he has a lifetime job with the police to collect his salary. Surely he cannot be accused of such narrow utility-maximization? Well, maybe and maybe
not. Now to the book.
66. See, e.g. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521
(1987). It is true that Priest's Yale colleague, Guido Calabresi, has long practiced a brand of
economic analysis more subtle and thus less conspicuous than some of the Posnerian excess. But
as the fellow says: That was then; this is now. In the early days, Calabresi, however modest in
his pretensions, seemed astonished at the breadth of his own vision, and unclear as to where it
might take him. See Calabresi, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, BS HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
67. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms ofMarket Efficiency, 10 VA. L. REV. 549
(1984); Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1985).
68. See, e.g., Cooter, Liberty, Efficiency, and Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Autumn 1987,
at 141; Rose-Ackerman, Dikes, Dams, and Vicious Hogs: Entitlement and Efficiency in Tort
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 25 (1989).
69. For another, not exactly parallel, account of Posner and the world beyond law and economics, see Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REV. 724
(1988).
70. I know I'm trying to bait Posner into denying that he is a rational maximizer. Only in
my dreams, I suspect.
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For the connoisseur of Posnerianism, much of the book will be
familiar. It includes many of the distinctive markings by which we
can easily identify Posner: superabundant energy, vast (if patchy) erudition, the crust of a burglar. The rhetorical strategies are likewise
familiar. Here, as elsewhere, Posner likes to disarm his critics by proliferating his learning almost offhandedly ("Oh, everybody knows
that!"). 71 Similarly, he likes to preempt criticism by suggesting that he
understands all the possible defects in his position (without really
showing exactly how he escapes them). 72 Along the way, he scatters a
few elementary self-contradictions that betray the casualness of his
construction. Thus, on page ninety-eight he says that "the key" to
Shakespeare's greatness is found inter alia in his "brilliant plots" - a
wholly implausible suggestion that is effectively countered by much of
Posner's own plot analysis. Similarly, he says that "[a]nyone who today took seriously the implied moral values of ... The Iliad ... would
be a public menace" (p. 300). Yet two pages later, he is saying that
"the Iliad is the oldest surviving expression of awareness that foreigners who are your mortal enemies might nevertheless have feelings as
you" (p. 302). Exactly; that is why it is a heroically moral, rather than
immoral, piece of work. 1 3
71. Posner seems to take particular delight in parading his skill in foreign languages, offering
his own renderings of German (pp. 115, 120, 124), French (p. 86), Greek (pp. 212, 278), and
English (p. 254). The Greek seems particularly gratuitous. The passage is five lines from the
Iliad, where Chryse appeals for the return of his daughter. Posner says he translated "literally,
to preserve the word order, which is important ...." P. 277. Apparently he wants to show the
"tit-for-tat" structure of the passage: you get your wish, I get mine. But in fact, the structure is
almost inescapable and any of a dozen translations would have made the point. E.V. Rieu renders it: " 'May the gods that live on Olympus grant your wish - on this condition, that you
show your reverence for the Archer-god Apollo Son of Zeus by accepting this ransom and releasing my daughter.' " See HOMER, THE ILIAD 1 (E. Rieu trans. ed. 1950). And Alexander Pope's
classic translation uses the same structure:
Ye Kings and Warriors! may your Vows be crown'd,
And Troy's proud Walls lie level with the Ground.
May Jove restore you, when your Toils are o'er,
Safe to the Pleasures of your native Shore.
But oh! relieve a wretched Parent's Pain,
And give Chruseis to these Arms again;
HOMER, THE ILIAD 44 (A. Pope trans. 1965). It is also unclear why Posner, in transliterating
the Greek (p. 278) adds emphasis to the first "A" and the first "o" in "Apollo" (Gr. "Apollona"). The "o" in this case is "omicron," unlike the second "o," which is an "omega" and thus
correctly lengthened. The first "A" bears a spiritus lenis, but is not otherwise distinguished.
Posner may have failed to recognize that this is a penultimate spondee, rather than the far more
common dactyl.
72. See, for example, his discussion of "intentionalism" in ch. 5, and compare his yes/no
relation to utilitarianism in R. PosNER, supra note 57, at 48-87.
73. Posner might have understood the full impact of his own remark had he paid more attention to James Boyd White's essay and absorbed what White was saying, rather than what Posner
wanted him to say. See J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LosE THEIR MEANING 24-58 (1984); cf. pp.
52-54. The seminal modem appreciation of the Iliad as a distinctively moral work is Novis,
L'Iliadeou lepoe'me de la force, CAHIERS DU SUD, Dec. 1940, at 561, Jan. 1941, at 21. Concededly, other critics make a case to the contrary, but the point stands in Posner not so much as a
settled dispute as an unnoticed contradiction.
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Probably of greater entertainment value, the book is dappled with
some of those swaths of economic reductionism that so outrage Posner's foes. I remember the story of a fellow who toured the great cities
of Europe discovering exotic caterpillars. How do you find caterpillars in, say, the heart of Paris? "Oh, it's easy - you just look for their
trails." 74 Posner, likewise, can find the economic caterpillar where the
rest of us can't even see the slime. "Revenge," for example, is a
caveman version of the felicific calculus (p. 28). Literary value is survival in the competitive marketplace (p. 71). Alcoholics "choose" alcoholism over sobriety in much the same way that you or I choose
widgets over blivets, chintz over lace (p. 195). And my own favorite:
discussing The Merchant of Venice, Posner remarks that "no one asks
why Antonio did not protect himself from default by insuring his cargoes .... " 75 Nobody asks why Ahab didn't have a sharper harpoon,
either, but it certainly would not have done much for the plot.
There is a good reason for this particular kind of absurdity. Posner, by training if not by temperament, comes from a tradition that
makes him peculiarly ill-qualified for literary studies. The first principle of Posner's economics is its positivism, here distinguished by its
fealty to what you might call "the great as-if," known more technically as "the Alchian thesis." 76 The Alchian thesis holds, in effect,
that if my prediction of your behavior turns out to be accurate, then it
makes no difference whether my assumption of your motivation is the
same as your interpretation of your motivation. You say you are
building a cathedral; I say you are maximizing utility. If the hypothesis of utility-maximization proves fruitful, then that is all there is to it:
no self-respecting "science" need go further.
It takes only the briefest reflection to suggest how momentous this
"as-if" might be, as a methodological hypothesis. If the great as-if is
going to hold, then the "interpretative" studies, including virtually all
of literary studies, are irrelevant. For "interpretation," and not prediction, is what literary studies are about.
Now, the notion of an "interpretative" science is a contentious
idea, to put it mildly, and the controversy bristles with abstruse exegesis, technical jargon, the works. And at the end of the day, the Alchian hypothesis might even be right. But Posner, giving testimony to
74. If you don't like that one, remember the tailor who went to visit the king. "What was he
like?" his friends asked. "Oh, about a 42-long."
75. P. 94 n.34. Posner adds: "as he could have done," giving him the opportunity to festoon
the manuscript with citations to two histories of insurance law - thus assuring us that actuarial,
as well as literary, history, falls within the purview of his competence. Is it captious to inquire
just where Posner might be locating the hypothetical Antonio -le., in "Venice," or in "Shakespeare's idea of Venice" (le., "London")?
76. After A.A. Alchian. A concise explanation and criticism is in M. BLAUG, THE METH115-19 (1980).
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his security in the positivist tradition, doesn't seem to notice it is a
problem.
·
This fact alone is enough to suggest the familiar Posner, full of
cheery inaifference to second thoughts or criticism. But do not be
deceived by the surface. Despite all the similarities in tone between
this Posner and the Posner we have known, something subtle but important stands revealed before us. On close scrutiny, I think this book
presents a Posner far more placating, more eager to please, more uncertain of his own position. The parade of intellect is a bit too urgent,
the cocksureness a bit shrill. It's not so much "everybody knows that."
It's more like "/ can play with the big kids, too." If Fish is stout
Cortes gazing at the Pacific, then Posner is Liza crossing the ice.
You can get the picture, for example, in the very first line, where
Posner speaks of "Law and literature, the subject of this book" (p. 1).
Now any sophisticated academic - certainly Posner - is aware of
just how critical the matter of turf is to the academic enterprise. After
all, Posner built his career on creating his own subdiscipline. And
much of his work can be understood as just that: not just exploring
law and economics and claiming it for the queen, but declaring its
existence and demonstrating and justifying the same. 77 I have suggested above that there is not one field called "law and literature," but
rather several, more or less rudely thrown together. Posner seems to
recognize this, but he responds in a curious and instructive way. He
itemizes a great number of things that might pass as law and literature.
Indeed, his introduction is heavy with lists: five "most important connections between law and literature" (pp. 5-9), together with four "potential links" that are "superficial or misleading" whatever that may
mean,78 and finally nine "principal omissions" - i.e., fields that "I
have not tried to explore .... "79
But how would a young man of spirit (i.e., Posner circa 1967) have
responded to this disarray? He would adopt one of two postures, both
drawn from the model of the Italian city-states. These are:· (a) Louis
XII seeking conquest by invasion and annexation; or (b) Cesare Borgia
seeking the same by mobilizing the home folks. 80 Posner adopted
model (a) when he invaded the precincts of the law with the shock
troops of economics twenty years ago; a younger and more energetic
Posner might have undertaken either model today. But Posner does
77. It is customary, for example, to treat his coursebook as "seminal," with the sense that it
created the field.
78. P. 1. It is not clear, for example just who is superficially misled, but one has the sense it
may have been Posner himself as he set out to assemble materials for this book.
79. P. 19. But they are fields that he wants to assure us he knows about, and has thought
about. Clever students do the same sort of thing on the last part of their law school essay exams.
80. If the analogy of Renaissance buccaneering seems ungracious, consider the discussion of
the revival of individualism and the rise of Renaissance humanism in 1 J. BURKHARDT, THE
CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY (1958). See in particular pp. 163-74.
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neither. Indeed, at the bottom of page one, he refers to the "potential
links between law and literature" as a "rich but confusing array." A
younger Posner would have said "a rich but seemingly confusing array," and then gone on to show us how, in fact, it was not confusing at
all.
And so the theme of the "misunderstood relationship" turns out,
on closer scrutiny, to be no theme at all. That subtitle really gives the
game away: it is sufficiently abstract to cover almost anything, correctly betraying the inference that almost anything is what the author
intends to cover. The earlier chapters bear the mark of the "Type 1"
or "ethical" approach to law and literature, criticizing other writers,
or criticizing other critics criticizing other writers. Later chapters examine, by turns, strategies of interpretation (Type 2) and judicial rhetoric (Type 3). The final chapter deals with issues of defamation,
obscenity and copyright - topics which, as Posner seems to concede,
are not normally discussed under the rubric of "law and literature" at
all. While he has scattered worthwhile insights in this final chapter,
they really belong more to the law of property than to anything associated with literature and I will not discuss them further in this review.
Further inquiry fails to quash the earlier suspicion of disorder.
Chapter 1, entitled "Revenge as Legal Prototype and Literary Genre,"
sounds like it promises a theme, but in fact, it offers a peculiarly random grab-bag of material - a collation of Cliffs' Notes-style plot summaries, together with a good-natured chiding of Posner's former
colleague, James Boyd White, for not discussing revenge in an instance
where Posner seemingly feels he should have. 81 At best, the chapter
reads like a continuation of the theme Posner pursued more or less
perfunctorily in the second quarter of The Economics of Justice. 82
Still, in both that work and his new one, it is not entirely clear what
Posner is up to. In fact, I think Posner does have the germ of a unifying theme for all this material, although I suspect that he, himself, has
not understood it yet. In footnote forty-eight on page 161 of the present book, Posner discusses the (possible) role of revenge in establishing
the divergence between the tradition of positivism and the tradition of
natural law. Now, that is a topic with some potential. And, Posner
might be able to use all the material he seems to have collected on
revenge. But the notes alone are not sufficient to constitute a text, or
even an essay on the subject.
Chapter 2, called "The Reflection of Law in Literature," plows
some familiar ground: a discussion of literary works that take (or purport to take) law as a theme. Posner's choices of subject are for the
81. The culprit text is an essay by White on the Iliad, though why in heaven's name White
shoUld be taken to task for not writing about Issue B when he did (concededly) write about Issue
A is nowhere disclosed. See J.B. WHITE, supra note 73, at 24-58.
82. R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 119-227.
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most part pretty predictable - Crime and Punishment, The Merchant
of Venice, that sort of thing. Once again, however, the crux of the
matter seems to be tucked away in another chapter. Specifically, Posner says: "The occupational hazard oflawyer-critics is to suppose that
literature on legal themes represents law more literally than other
literature represents its themes" - one "might as well read Animal
Farm as a tract on farm management, or Moby Dick as an expose of
the whaling industry" (p. 180). But this passage represents precisely
the trap Posner sets for himself: he seems to think that "legal" literary
works can be judged on the basis of their factual accuracy. On this
analysis, a work that fails to represent the legal universe with factual
accuracy is impaired in its relevance to the lawyer's life. Thus, Posner
dwells at length on The Merchant of Venice and "[t]he lack of realism
in the play's treatment oflaw ... " (p. 94). In the same vein, he tries to
show how Kafka's Trial is a dream-like parody of the "real" judicial
process, not the thing itself. 83
Suppose for a moment that Posner is correct in his assessment of
factual accuracy in books of this sort. 84 What are the implications?
They are surely interesting and complex; but Posner touches on them
only indirectly and in the most ill-formed way. Without attempting to
dispose of the issue as a whole, let me offer two possible lines of
approach.
First, even assuming that a particular work (the Merchant of Venice, say) is factually inaccurate, it does not follow in the least way that
the work is inaccurate in spirit or texture or tone. It may be, and it
may-not. The issue is difficult, and the possibilities are explosive - it
is certainly easy to play fast and loose with notions like "spiritual"
accuracy, as any decent lawyer will understand. But it is an issue or if it is not, it rests on the opponent (as it were, Posner), to show just
why it is not. And Posner here has done nothing of the sort.
Second, Posner seems to assume (although he doesn't spell this
out) that if a work has no factual relevance to the life of the lawyer,
then it can have no more relevance to the life of a lawyer than it may
to any other person. 85 But this also is undemonstrated. It may be that
the "ethical core" of each and every great novel is universal. Or it
83. See, e.g., pp. 119-27. He seems similarly concerned to stress the differences between
Anglo-American and continental legal procedure, to the disadvantage of the latter. Thus,
Catnus' L'Etranger provides "a reason, howeve(jpadvertent on Catnus' part, for preferring the
Anglo-American system" (p. 88). In passages like this, one is tempted to infer that the measure
of literary merit is the degree to which a work gives grounds for self-congratulation about the
superiority of the Anglo-American legal system.
84. In fact, I think that Posner has rather the better of things on matters of fact.
85. Also (and more tentatively), I would venture that Posner has no very clear notion of why
literature might be important to anybody. He is generous with words like "marvelous" in labeling the works that he is skewering (see, e.g., p. 122). But one has the sense that he thinks of
literature as little more than an entertainment, with no conviction that it might play a part, say,
in a person's moral education.
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may be that the ethical challenges presented in certain works of art are
specially or even peculiarly relevant to the life of the law - whether or
not they present the law as their "nominal" subject. On this model,
Billy Budd may be an "important" lawyer novel independent of what
it may say about the law, or Middlemarch may be an important lawyer
novel even though it is not "about" law and lawyers at all. 86 They
may be - but you won't get any discussion on the point, pro or con,
from Posner, who doesn't seem to have thought of the idea. 87
Chapter 3 is a deception, but a kind of deception familiar in academic work, for which Posner is no more culpable than anyone else.
The chapter is called "The Literary Indictment of Legal Injustice." In
fact, it is no more than an extended book review: the true subject is
Posner's criticism ofRichard Weisberg's criticism of the literary indictment of legal injustice - similar to, but hardly the same as, the topic
promised. Adding my own two cents' worth to these arcanae would
be unfairly burdensome on the reader here; suffice it to say that I took
my own shot at Weisberg in a review apparently published about the
same time as Posner's, and that I think Posner and I parallel each
other at a number of points. 88
Chapters 1 through 3 seem to belong more or less to the ethical or
Type 1 branch of legal studies. The rest of the book largely reposes
elsewhere. Chapter 6, on "The Judicial Opinions as Literature,"
seems to me to belong to Type 3, or rhetorical studies. This chapter
seems more superficial than much of the rest of the book, not inviting
extended comment. Anyone seriously interested in the rhetoric of law
and economics would do better to start with Donald McCloskey's fine
article published in this journal two years ago (certainly too late for
consideration by Posner in his book). 89
86. Yes, of course, Middlemarch is "about" the law to the extent it is, for example, about a
society in which divorce is nearly impossible. But by this measure, everything is "about" the law,
and neither Posner nor I would accept so expansive a definition.
87. Posner does seem to recognize the possibility in a more or less incidental way at the end
of the book, but this is so far from his main discussion that it bears all the earmarks of an
afterthought. Something to improve on in the next draft, if he ever gets to it.
88. The original of this chapter is Posner, From Billy Budd to Buchenwald, 96 YALE L.J.
1173 (1987). Ayer, The Very Idea of ''Law and Literature," 85 MICH. L. REV. 895 (1987).
Risking tedium, I must add that I think Posner's interpretation of Nietzsche in this chapter is
superficial in the extreme. While he correctly accepts Nietzsche as the author of the notion of
ressentiment, he seems unclear on whether Nietzsche is the critic of the "resentful" man or is
himself the man he criticizes. Nietzsche himself had no doubts on the point: he thought the
"resentful" man was a great betrayal of human possibility. Nietzsche may have been wrong, but
the point, like many others raised in Posner's book, remains unexplored because it goes unnoticed. I also think he is far too simplistic in his analysis of Camus' L 'Etranger. For one thing, it
may be true that Mersault was a culpable wrongdoer (Posner and I agree here). But the fact
remains that Mersault may have been executed for the wrong reason (Posner seems not to consider the point). Moreover, while Camus may or may not be culpable for the views imputed to
him on the basis of L 'Etranger, it seems to me that at least he had adopted a more sociable point
of view by the time he wrote La Chute and L 'Homme Revo/ti.
89. See McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1988).
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In Chapter 5 on interpretation, Posner at once seems to embrace
and to deny a theory of original intent90 the idea that we must, or can,
be "bound" by the "intent of the drafter" in construing a legal directive. In this discussion, Posner focuses on two issues while largely
ignoring (as.if unnoticed) a third. The two that he discusses are: (1)
whether "original intent" is doable - i.e., whether we can determine
intent in any useful way; and (2) whether the task of determining intent is the same for literature as it is for law.
The undiscussed third issue is whether any theory of original intent
- naive or otherwise - makes sense. I don't want to be misunderstood here: I suspect that some version of originalism probably does
make sense. But just what version that might be, or on what basis it
might be justified, is far from clear. Posner, unfortunately, seems to
regard the case for originalism as self-evident and therefore not in need
of justification.91
Posner's failure to explain or justify his version of intentionalism
cripples his discussion of the two other points. Thus, as to the first the feasibility of intentionalism - Posner's answer seems to be: yes,
there are feasibility problems with intentionalism, but you can do it
"well enough" (my words). Posner's position seems to me at least arguable, but the critical issue is - well enough in terms of what? Particularly if you concede the feasibility problems (as Posner does), then
the best you can do is a kind of cost-benefit analysis, showing what
you gain by the compromises you must perforce make. And you cannot do that without knowing the benefits of the intentionalism you are
trying to protect.
As to the second - the relation of "literary" interpretation to
"legal" - Posner's presentation seems to me to betray a fundamental
misunderstanding. His thesis is that the "literary" interpreter is free
in a sense that a "legal" interpreter is not-i.e., that the "legal" interpreter has a social obligation that the "literary" interpreter does not
share. In a very restrictive sense, Posner is undoubtedly onto some90. Once again, this seems to be a familiar Posner rhetorical technique: to make it clear that
he understands all the sophisticated criticisms of a position, and to say that of course he wouldn't
believe anything that naive - without ever showing exactly how, and in what way, his own
position differs from the "naive" position just criticized. This is his tactic with originalism; he
adopted somewhat the same strategy several years ago in showing why he was not a utilitarian.
See R. POSNER, supra note 57, at 58-87.
91. Unless you count a single paragraph on p. 246, which I quote in full:
I cannot hope in this chapter, or in this book, to persuade doubters that the intentionalist or
communicative view of statutory and constitutional interpretation is the correct one. That
would require a book of its own. But I hope I have persuaded the reader that criticisms of
an intentionalist approach to literature - criticisms I find convincing - do not undermine
legal intentionalism.
That paragraph occurs something over halfway through the chapter, which probably is sufficient
to demonstrate just how improvisational this presentation must be. In any event, it is not the
least way plausible that a case for interpretation "would require a book of its own." Or at any
rate, not for so capable a simplificateur as Posner.

1610

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:1584

thing here. That is, a "legal" interpreter can support his interpretations with violence far more easily than his literary counterpart: she
can call out the bailiffs. But this shows only that she has an obligation
to interpret rightly. It does not show what right interpretation might
consist of. Posner, of course, assumes originalism. But he seems to
assume that a failure to interpret according to original intent is a failure to interpret rightly. This is true only if originalism is itself right,
which, to repeat, he has not shown, or even attempted to show.
Posner is also incorrect in assuming that the literary interpreter is
as free as he seems to suppose. True, the cost of an error in interpretation may be lower when it is the error of some ink-stained scribbler in
a law review than when it is the error of, say, a Seventh Circuit judge.
But the ink-stained scribbler has just as great an obligation to truth as
any judge, no matter how powerful. Posner seems to have confused
the consequence with the rightness or wrongness of the thing itself- a
,. vulgar kind of instrumentalism of which he likes to think himself
free. 92
This leaves me with Chapter 4, which lies at the (physical) center
of the book, and seems to me central also to understanding whether it
is possible that Posner will ever achieve a coherent notion of literature
and the law. The chapter is called "Two Legal Perspectives on
Kafka." This is, in a sense, a very odd title, and serves to show just
how unformed Posner's thought must be. What we have here is Posner's side of the Posner-West debate, discussed above. 93 Presumably
the "two" views are Posner's and West's, although here again (as with
the Fish essays discussed earlier), we are up against the irritating problem that the adversary does not speak for herself: better to think of it
as "Posner's view," and "Posner's view of West's view," and remember that within these covers, she does not get a chance to make her
own case.
In any event, Posner writes as if the Posner-West debate was about
Kafka. It is not. In fact, the full title of West's seminal essay is "Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner. " 94 Thus, at
the very least, it is ·about Posner just as much as it is about Kafka. In
any event, as the title makes clear, it isn't really about either of them:
it is about "Authority, Autonomy, and Choice," or "[t]he Role of
Consent," with Kafka and Posner alike serving as no more than
examples. 95
92. I leave aside the question whether the ink-stained scribbler may have more long-run
influence than the circuit judge. Of course this may be true, but it is also true that I may win $40
million in the lottery. True, and not worth losing any sleep over.
93. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
94. See West, supra note 61.
95. Posner got it better in his Harvard response, entitled The Ethical Significance of Free
Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1431 (1986).
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As a rhetorical ploy on West's part, it was grand, which the
Harvard Law Review editors happily understood: everybody96 knows
about Kafka, and knows what poor, miserable wretches his characters
are. Show that Posner's moral vision is Kafkaesque, and you have
done a great deal to undermine it. It is therefore a matter of great
interest that Posner chooses to respond with an essay about Kafka,
rather than going straight to the larger issue.
A fair-minded reader might object that Posner should be allowed
to play by West's rules. She tried to show that Posner is like Kafka;
let him show that he is not. That might, indeed, have been a legitimate
tactic. But it isn't what Posner has done. Rather, he tries to show
that West misunderstands Kafka. Still, assume that he is correct in
this assertion. Even then his decision has nothing to do with her underlying point, that Posner's universe is constructed on an impoverished model of choice. Put simply, what divides the Posnerians, on
the one hand, from West and her ilk is the question whether all
choices are alike. The Posnerians say "yes." Their opponents say
"no."
There is a great gulf fixed here, and no one has yet figured out how
to bridge it. You get it in sharpest relief in this passage, just a little
over halfway through Posner's book: "An alcoholic surrenders an important part of his freedom, and, it might seem, gets little in return.
Yet to prohibit people from becoming alcoholics would infringe their
freedom to choose a particular, if to the sober a revolting, mode of
life" (p. 195). One can pretty well say that if you buy that, then you
are a confirmed Posnerian. On the other hand, if you believe that the
Posnerian game makes no sense without some notion as to what it is to
be a person; that some "choices" expand the person, while some diminish her; that interfering with the power to choose may be, however
terrible a risk, still a necessary risk as part of our humanity, then you
take a different view. The interesting stuff in current legal thought is
the work (like West's) that is trying to develop just this sort of
distinction.
Two points about this work are important. First, it probably owes
a great deal to "vulgar" law and economics, in that it wouldn't have
come into being without the spur and goad of a generation of naive
Posnerians. Legal theorists didn't really worry about what it meant to
be a person before the economists put the issue in doubt: in adversity
lies opportunity.
Second - and this is very important - this new "personalism" is
by no means the province of any particular political sect. West herself
seems determined to position herself on the "feminist left." 97 Other
important contributions come from other scholars whose "feminist"
96. Or at least, the readers of the Harvard Law Review.
97. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 63. By "feminist left," I mean the "left"
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credentials are not open to doubt. 98 On the other hand, one of the first
important attempts to outline a rights-based case against vulgar
economism came from Charles Fried, certainly the bete noir of the
politically correct. 99 And the most eloquent recent statement of a notion of personhood is Anthony Kronman's new essay on "Living in
the Law." 100 Indeed, if anyone is missing from this catalog, it is the
"conventional" (as distinct from the "feminist") left.101
In my mind, this new literature of "personalism" is very much the
center of the action in the law reviews today, just as the center was
with Coase and Calabresi - and the young Posner - a generation
ago. Increasingly, Posner seems to meet the new critics with some
very shopworn arguments. Of course it limits the freedom of an alcoholic to constrain his choice. Of course my helper may be my enemy.
Of course resources are limited and of course paternalism has costs.
We know that. But it's no longer sufficient as an end to the argument.
Today, it is just the beginning.
I don't mean to evoke pity for poor Posner here: I recognize that
Posner will still be at the head table, giving speeches and accepting
plaques, while I am eking out my pension by emptying the ashtrays in
the lobby. But I do think he understands that, in some important
sense, the game is up, and that the play of Posner-economics will never
be quite as much fun again as it was before. The boats, the cabs, and
the donkey carts are loaded; the train is building up steam in the station, and Posner is rushing to get on board. He probably will get on
board, too - no, he is on board, fumbling his way down the aisle
('scuse me; pardon me; 'scuse me please), lugging a fairly large briefcase full of paperwork, and finally he'll find himself a place in the club
car, near the brandy and good cigars. And inevitably, he'll talk. And
more and more, he'll talk about how things Used to Be. We all grow
flank of "feminism" - if, indeed, feminism recognizes a left. The terminology is mine. West
makes her own attempt to classify feminists in the article just cited.
98. Heading the list would be Margaret Jane Radin. See, in particular, Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1987).
99. See c. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978).
100. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987). In this essay, Kronman
argues not just for a particular notion of personality, but also for the relevance of that notion to
the life of the lawyer. It is possible to embrace the first of his two points while retaining reservations about the second. For the core of his notion of personality and choice, see id. at 850-52.
101. It seems to me that scholars on the left have been most effective in attacking "vulgar
economism" when they surprised the enemy in its own tents - le., when they undertook to
show the incoherence of the economists' analysis from within the premisES of economics itself.
See, e.g., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis ofEntitlement Programs: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV.
387 (1981). This is not the place to give an account of just why the left has been so silent on the
concept of the person, but it probably has something to do with the left's skepticism about the
idea of rights. See, e.g., Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1563 (1984); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L.
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older, and the unlucky grow old. First you forget names, they say;
then faces; then you forget to pull your zipper up; then you forget to
pull it down. It's a miserable business, and you shield yourself from
the misery by wrapping yourself in old times - the good times before
the floods of feminism, of crypto-Marxism, of literary criticism, when
Milton and Kafka scholars knew how to keep their place. Why, did I
ever tell you the one about the market for babies? Yes? Well, it's a
good story, so anyway, but here goes ...

